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Constitution making was an essential part of the process of decoloniza-
tion in the South Pacific. Deliberations on constitutions and their progres-
sive development as instruments of independence were, as in Africa, less a
reluctant response to political pressures from nationalists than attempts
by the colonial powers themselves to speed and control the process of
decolonization. That the initiative remained, for the most part, with the
colonial powers, had a significant effect on the process of constitution
making and on the structure and contents of the constitutions. For exam-
ple, it meant that the agenda and the parameters for the constitution were
defined by the colonial powers. This did not preclude the participation of
the local people and their leaders in the making of the constitution (indeed
the constitution-making process in most places was highly democratic),
but several factors conspired to make that participation more symbolic
than substantive.
In Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, vigorous attempts were
made to consult with the people, through questionnaires and tours of the
country by committees set up to recommend on the constitution for inde-
pendence. However, the choices offered to the people, derived largely
from the experience of the colonial powers, were complex, and their intri-
cacies probably beyond the comprehension of most people. While this
consultation lent an aura of legitimacy to the constitution, it did not sig-
nificantly influence its contents. With a few exceptions, political leaders,
who were more actively involved in the process, had little experience of
administration and were not able to foresee clearly the administrative
implications of constitutional arrangements. Their knowledge of compar-
ative constitutional systems was limited, and, as they had risen to emi-
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nence through constitutional arrangements sponsored by the colonial
powers (themselves based on the home models), there was a predilection
for the system they knew. Constitutional consultants, largely from out-
side, played an important role. Recruited so that they might enable local
leaders to make their own decisions, they inevitably influenced these deci-
sions, particularly, as in Solomon Islands, where negotiations with the
colonial power formed a crucial part of the process of agreeing on the con-
stitution. Constraints on the choices of the leaders were occasionally
placed by the colonial power, more so in the case of Solomon Islands than
Papua New Guinea. (See Ghai 1988a for a detailed discussion of these
points.)
On the whole, the leaders and people of these countries took considera-
ble pride in the formulation of their constitutions (and in Papua New
Guinea there was much celebration of its "homegrownness" or autoch-
thony). Nevertheless there was some uneasiness (at least in Solomon
Islands) that the process had not been entirely voluntary and that its
results might not be fully suitable for the new circumstances in which the
country found itself. The notion that the final word on the subject of the
constitution had not been spoken was explicitly acknowledged in the
Papua New Guinea Constitution, which provided for its review three
years after its adoption by a general constitutional commission (§260). It
is therefore not surprising that both countries have undertaken extensive
reviews of their constitutions. In this article I shall examine and comment
on these reviews, after first providing a brief overview of the significance
and the principal contents .of the constitutions.
INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS
The constitutions in both countries were based on westminster principles,
under which the government is elected from and responsible to an elected
legislature. An important difference from other westminster-based sys-
tems lay in the method of appointment of the prime minister, who is not
appointed in the discretion of the head of state, but elected by the legisla-
ture itself, a response to both the underdeveloped state of political parties
and the wish to enhance the role and authority of the legislature. The gov-
ernment can be dismissed only by a vote of no confidence by the legisla-
ture, and in the event of such a vote does not have the alternative of seek-
ing the dissolution of parliament (except in the last six months of its life in
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Papua New Guinea, when a dissolution is automatic). The head of state is
the reigning monarch in the United Kingdom and is represented in each
country by a governor-general, who, in another departure from the stan-
dard westminster practice, is in effect elected by the legislature for a fixed
term. (The decision to keep a foreign monarch as head of state was con-
troversial) .
The electoral systems are based on single-member constituencies and
plurality voting (that is, "first-past-the-post" system). Both constitutions
establish or provide for a system of decentralized government, under
which elected governments in the provinces enjoy considerable legislative,
administrative, and financial autonomy; provincial autonomy is stronger
and more securely entrenched in Papua New Guinea than in Solomon
Islands. There are comprehensive provisions for human rights, which are
enforceable in the courts, and Papua New Guinea also has directive prin-
ciples of policy. The judiciary is independent, and mechanisms exist to
safeguard the autonomy of the police and the public service in routine
administration.
Despite consultation with the people and the active involvement of their
leaders, the constitutions cannot be said to be rooted in indigenous con-
cepts of power, authority, and decision making, for a number of reasons.
These lie in the difficulty of expanding these concepts, which are peculiar
to an island or group, to the national scale; in the constitutional evolution
over several decades of colonial rule along Western lines; in the emergence
to eminence of an educated, Christianized and Westernized elite with a
loyalty to and dependence on modern state institutions; and in the influ-
ence of successive bureaucrats and consultants. With them, notions of
economic development and state management of resources had primacy,
militating against experiments in participatory democracy. For example,
during the last stages of drafting the PNG Constitution, the expatriate
draftsman, in conjunction with expatriate civil servants, made an impor-
tant alteration to §I48 so that ministers were not able to direct or control
their civil servants (Ghai and Hegarty I982).
It is easier to describe the outlines of the constitutions than to assess
their significance, though certain statements may be made with some con-
fidence. The constitutions provided, on the whole, acceptable frame-
works for national unity and the exercise of public power. They served to
integrate the countries, for there had not yet developed a nationalism that
could be counted on to hold them together, fragmented as they were by
IQ
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ethnicity and physical separation. Yet the integrative effect was incom-
plete, for the district of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea and the West-
ern District in Solomon Islands refused to accept the respective constitu-
tions, and removed their objections only after acceptable provisions for
provincial autonomy had been conceded. The very process of constitution
making, with committees traveling through the country canvassing views
on important issues of public policy, had, almost for the first time, led to
nationwide political discourse and had an integrative effect. The constitu-
tions, with their provisions for liberal franchise and responsible govern-
ment, conferred legitimacy on the state and its apparatus.
The constitutions established new frameworks for political competi-
tion. Because each was largely a westminster framework, with a premium
on political activity organized along party lines, it was likely to have a sig-
nificant effect on the development of politics-away, in the course of time,
from locally based groups. Among other consequences, this would affect
the relationship between the center and the regions. The democratization
of state institutions would also affect political developments, leading to
the concerns of governments and politicians to mobilize and maintain sup-
port. The way in which that support was mobilized and maintained
would in turn influence economic development, as the state was likely to
continue its role as the primary instrument of accumulation and reproduc-
tion. With the access of local people to political power, and through it
economic power, a process of fairly rapid social differentiation and class
formation was likely to be set in motion. However, the impact of the con-
stitutions should not be overestimated, for the bureaucracy and its powers
remained largely intact, and the underlying economic forces would deter-
mine rather than be ruled by the constitutional arrangements. Neverthe-
less, the constitutions opened up space for political and economic changes
that would affect the destinies of these countries and were therefore likely
to attract considerable interest and concern.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
In pursuance of the Constitution (§260) and the Constitutional Commis-
sion Act 1973, the General Constitutional Commission was set up at the
end of 1978. Its primary responsibility was to enquire into the working of
the Constitution and to recommend amendments to the Constitution or
laws. The commission had nine members, drawn from both national and
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provincial governments as well as from outside government; it was
intended to be broadly representative of the different areas of the country
and to give a balanced representation to the major political parties and
groups in the National Parliament. Despite this nonpartisan approach, its
membership, notably the chairmanship, was altered when there was a
change of government following a vote of no confidence in July 1980. The
commission issued two interim reports in 1979 and 1980 and the final
report in 1983 (PNG-GCC 1979; 1980; 1983). The first interim report was
intended primarily to provide a summary of the Constitution, of which
the commission found wide ignorance among the public, while the second
concentrated on a description of the systems of provincial and local gov-
ernment. The commission considered it premature to make recommenda-
tions on provincial and local government, which it proposed should be
undertaken after three years. The final report contained the commission's
analysis of the Constitution and its recommendations. The commission
was concerned to seek the views of the public on the Constitution as
widely as possible; it prepared summaries of the Constitution, promoted
discussions groups throughout the country and prepared questionnaires to
assist them, and toured all the provinces. It received several hundred sub-
missions, although the response from educated and professional groups as
well as from politicians was disappointing.
The commission was clearly disappointed by the lack of knowledge of
the provisions of the Constitution among both the public and the politi-
cians. It placed the major blame for this on the verbose and legalistic style
of the drafting, and several of its recommendations were directed toward
simplifying the language and shortening the length of the Constitution
(the PNG Constitution is one of the longest in the world), as well as
increasing popular awareness of the principles and substance of the Con-
stitution. To that end, it recommended the repeal of the Organic Laws and
their transformation into ordinary law. (Organic laws had themselves
been introduced to keep the Constitution short, allowing it to be confined
to basic principles and the establishment of key institutions. But the
increasing distance-and mistrust-between the Constitutional Planning
Committee [CPe] and the government of Chief Minister Somare led to the
inclusion of more and more provisions intended for Organic Laws into the
Constitution as well as to the entrenchment of the Organic Laws.) One
implication of the recommendations of the commission, which it did not
foresee, was that decentralization, which establishes the semifederal
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nature of the Constitution, would lose its constitutional status because it
is based essentially on the Organic Law on Provincial Government. The
commission identified decentralization as one of the successes of the con-
stitutional and political system and recommended strengthening it.
There is nothing to indicate that the commission was other than unani-
mous. On the whole the report is an endorsement of the Constitution.
Where it does recommend an amendment, it is frequently to give greater
effect to the intention of the Constitution or the views of the CPC, as with
the national goals and directive principles, or national economic auton-
omy. The framers of the Constitution had tried to establish those princi-
ples and chart the path of development, based on a mixture of humanism,
participatory democracy, and nationalism. The commission, realizing
that the attempt had not been successful, since corruption and income dif-
ferentials were increasing, recommended strengthening the provisions for
implementation of the principles. Hitherto they had been nonjusticiable,
but the commission proposed that they should become legally binding and
that noncompliance with them should lead to dismissal of the government
or persons in authority (1983, 17). It also proposed that the application of
the leadership code (which restricts and regulates commercial activities
and conduct in office of state officials) should be extended to bring further
categories of officials under its regime, and that the Ombudsman Com-
mission should be given increased powers of investigation and prosecu-
tion. The nationalist orientation of the commission found expression in
proposals for various restrictions on the rights of naturalized citizens (45);
for the redistribution to "the original owners" of land held by nonresident
foreigners (33), and for the incorporation of larger elements of custom in
the national legal system (278-279).
The commission made several recommendations to bolster the protec-
tion of human rights. It wanted the abolition of the death penalty and the
implementation of the right to official information already guaranteed by
the Constitution. It recommended simplifying as well as tightening the
emergency laws, and said that these laws should not be used to deal with
tribal fighting (as had occurred in the 1970S) except in dire circumstances.
It urged that the powers and resources of the public solicitor should be
increased. The training of the police force should be improved so that it
respects rights of citizens to a greater extent than it has so far (227), and
the quality and independence of constitutional office holders should be
enhanced (264-267). Unfortunately the commission (as with the commit-
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tee in Solomon Islands) was unable to extend the same concern to natural-
ized citizens (operating on the premise that these citizens abuse their status
to the detriment of indigenous people). It proposed that such citizens
should not be eligible for public office unless they had resided in the coun-
try for twenty years; and that the spouses and children of naturalized citi-
zens themselves should have to apply for citizenship within twelve months
of the adoption of its report. Naturalized citizens should not have any
business interests outside Papua New Guinea and would lose their citizen-
ship if they "abuse or misuse" their citizenship or divorce themselves from
the customary obligations of the community into which they have been
adopted or abuse or breach its custom. It recommended a moratorium of
fifteen years on further grant of naturalization, during which a review of
nationality law would be made.
The commission was in general in favor of decentralization, but
refrained from a detailed analysis of or recommendation on the subject as
it felt that the time was not yet ripe for a review. Moreover, the commis-
sion endorsed the recommendations of a wide-ranging review of the finan-
cial aspects of provincial government that had already been conducted
(although the report of the financial review committee was confused and
inconclusive). However, the commission made some recommendations to
strengthen the autonomy of the provinces, particularly from national poli-
ticians, and to increase their legislative powers through delegation or the
repeal of national legislation in concurrent areas. It also suggested that a
committee rather than a portfolio system (which all provinces have
adopted under the power given to them under the Organic Law on Provin-
cial Government) would be more suitable for government at the provincial
level.
The commission made a number of recommendations on the system of
government. It proposed the rejection of dominion status under the British
Queen in favor of a republic under an indigenous, largely ceremonial,
president. The mode of election and functions of the president would fol-
low closely the present provisions for the governor-general, except that
the president would be required to be at least 45 years of age and would
enjoy a five-year term (reduced from the present six years). The president
should have certain discretionary powers that would relate to the dissolu-
tion of the legislature and the proclamation of an emergency. At present
no discretionary powers to speak of are provided for, the governor-gen-
eral being required to act on the advice of the government or other speci-
giMAMS .,
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fied body (see Ghai and Cottrell 1990). It is clear that the commission
wanted the president to have the right, on personal discretion or on the
advice of the government, to declare an emergency, but it is not obvious
whether the advice, if actually given, would be binding (78). That the
president would be expected to exercise some kind of umpiring function
emerges from the recommendation that the president should be able to
dissolve parliament if "there is an urgent crisis in government" (86), a term
that is defined as "(a) widespread corruption and injustice in the National
Government, or (b) continual widespread industrial unrest within the
Public Services, or (c) the National Parliament is not able to meet within a
given time, after the Speaker has called a meeting, because of party con-
flicts, nation-wide industrial unrests or strikes, or (d) the Constitution is
under extreme pressure from the Government causing widespread upris-
ing, strikes or revolts" (95). These criteria are not precise, nor do they
always constitute justifiable grounds for dissolution-rather than, for
example, removing the government in (a) or disciplining public servants in
(b). In some circumstances dissolution, as a result of which the country
would be without a parliament for a considerable period, might aggravate
rather than solve the crisis. The wide (and crucial) discretion this proposal
would give the president is balanced by two proposed safeguards: the dis-
cretion would come into play only if parliament had not tried, or had
failed, to pass a resolution to dissolve parliament (§ I05[1][c]) as a way to
solve the crisis; and a committee composed of the president, the speaker of
parliament, and a former chief justice ("the Dissolution Committee") had
declared in favor of dissolution.
It is probable that, as in Solomon Islands, the recommendation to give
these discretionary powers to the president sprang from the view that the
present provisions are inadequate to deal with situations of deadlock or,
crisis, which might be resolved by either the dissolution of parliament or
the removal of government by the head of state. The commission makes
another proposal to deal with these situations: the president should have
the power to dissolve the parliament if it defeats the government on a
question that the prime minister has declared is a matter of confidence. At
present the only outcome of such a vote is that the government has to
resign (unless the vote is in the last year of the life of parliament, when
automatic dissolution follows). This proposal might be useful to restore
the balance between parliament and the executive, which some former
prime ministers consider is weighted against the executive (Chan 1988;
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Kenilorea 1983). Unfortunately the commission's recommendation on this
important point (96) does not state clearly what is to happen to the present
provisions on the consequences of a vote of no confidence or how the
president's discretion is to be exercised. For example, is it to be exercised
on the advice of the prime minister or after consultation with the Dissolu-
tion Committee?
Various other proposals of the commission, concerned with the stabil-
ity of governments, relate to the relationship between the executive and
parliament. The commission would not allow a motion of no confidence
within twelve months of the formation of a government, and even at other
times such a motion would only be permitted if it had the support of one
quarter of the members of parliament. On the other hand, contemplating
the possibility that strong party loyalties might keep a bad government in
power, the commission recommended that when a vote of no confidence is
moved for a second time, whether unsuccessfully or not, in the last twelve
months of the normal life of parliament, automatic dissolution should fol-
low (146). There is no guarantee that it is only against bad governments
that motions for such votes would be introduced. The proposal would
effectively give the opposition, provided it had the support of a quarter of
the parliament, the power to cut short the term of the government, and
would in practice frequently reduce the life of parliament to three years,
since the commission recommended a normal life of four years.
In fact, the commission did not think the development of such a degree
of party solidarity was imminent (indeed the contemporary problem is
weak party discipline and loyalty), as appears from another of its recom-
mendations to ensure stability: parliamentarians would lose their seats on
certain changes of party allegiance. Members who changed their "party
alliance" or voted against their own party within twelve months after a
general election, would lose their seats, as would members who changed
party alliances more than three times after the first twelve months follow-
ing a general election (II?). It is not entirely clear what the commission
means by "party alliance"; it could mean allegiance or refer to an alliance
formed by the member's party with another political group. If the latter
(which is the less plausible interpretation), it would be a serious deroga-
tion from the rights of a parliamentarian, especially if the alliance were
agreed after the elections. Presumably the leaders of the alliance would be
free to break it up without incurring a penalty, for otherwise the system of
coalitions would become very rigid.
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Although these changes would tend to stabilize the executive, the com-
mission was clearly anxious that this should not weaken parliament. The
commission made recommendations to "improve" the moral and intellec-
tual quality of parliamentarians, including a proposal under which a
member would be disqualified on grounds of alcoholism or illiteracy (II5-
II6), and there would be a greater control and scrutiny of the finances of
political parties (124-125). The commission urged a more active role for
parliamentarians in policymaking and monitoring of the executive
through a strengthening of the committee system, which has so far failed
to discharge the tasks envisaged for it by the CPC (121-124). The commis-
sion recommended the abolition of the provision for nominated members
(which has never been used) as well as of the provincial constituencies
(whereby each province elects a member on a single provincewide constit-
uency), as having outlived their rationale (II2-II3). The commission
approved of the first-past-the-post system of voting, but recommended
that voting be made compulsory, and proposed that parliament should be
convened within seven days of the holding of general elections (as opposed
to the present maximum of twenty-one days, during which party leaders
seek coalition partners-sometimes through various questionable meth-
ods-and a defeated government stays in office).
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN SOLOMON ISLANDS
In February 1987 Prime Minister Ezekiel Alebua appointed a committee to
review the Constitution and report to the government by 31 July 1987.
(The committee was not in fact able to report until January 1988.)
It is not obvious from the report why it was considered necessary to
review the Constitution. In July 1982, when Solomon Mamaloni was
prime minister, he had appointed a committee to review the Constitution
(Larmour 1983,262). Mamaloni himself had taken no part in the prepara-
tion of the independence Constitution (being out of the legislature),
although he had had considerable influence on constitutional develop-
ment up to then. It was known that he was critical of some aspects of the
Constitution, in particular the degree of centralization of power. The
terms of reference of the 1982 committee were quite specific; it was to pro-
pose a "quasi-federal" system of government and to provide for an execu-
tive president, with powers to dissolve parliament or dismiss the prime
minister' during political crisis or stalemate and to command security and
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defense in time of emergency. The committee consisting of seven members
of parliament and three national lawyers, including the attorney-general,
was chaired by Andrew Nori, who was the secretary-general of the Peo-
ple's Alliance Party, to which Mamaloni himself belonged. The committee
made some progress but was overtaken by the general elections of 1984
when Mamaloni's government fell. The new prime minister, Sir Peter
Kenilorea, as chief minister had played a key role in the drafting of the
independence Constitution and appears to have been less interested in a
review, although he was not happy with some aspects of the Constitution
(Kenilorea 1983, 53-62).
In recognition of his special interest in constitutional matters, Alebua
appointed Mamaloni, now the leader of the opposition, as chairman of
the committee. Other members were five other members of parliament,
including Deputy Prime Minister Kenilorea and Nori, now minister of
home affairs, one businessman (a former minister), and one representative
each for the churches and for women. .
The terms of the review were broad and did not give any guidance to
the committee. After extensive travels in the country and wide consulta-
tion with the people, the committee produced its report in the form of two
alternative recommendations. The report does not make clear the prefer-
ence of the members themselves or indicate whether the committee was
divided in its opinion. Therefore no guidance is offered either to the public
or the government about the choice between two quite different sets of
proposals, a choice that is rendered even more problematic because the
reasons for the proposals are not clearly stated. It does seem that the com-
mittee was divided and that the first alternative had the support primarily
of only Mamaloni. Proposals under each of the alternatives are set out in
considerable detail, but no systematic justification for them is provided,
so that it is not generally possible to say what defects of the present consti-
tution they are a response to. The committee has included a paper in
which it analyzes the defects of the Constitution (Background Paper No.6
in Volume 2); that analysis is relevant to Recommendation 1 rather than
Recommendation 2. In any case, as I argue later, that analysis is related
less to the provisions of the Constitution than to national development
policy.
Proposals under Recommendation 1 are more interesting than those
under Recommendation 2, but perhaps they are also less practical. They
suggest major changes in the present system, whereas Recommedation 2
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accepts its principal features. Recommendation I proceeds on the premise
that many of what it regards as the ailments of the country-elitism,
unfair distribution of benefits, dependence on the outside world, the
expanding role of the state and the limited growth of the private, indige-
nous sector, and the narrow base of the economy-are the result of the
Constitution. These can only be remedied if the Constitution is based on
new principles, of which three stand out.
The first is the acknowledgment of the ethnic and cultural diversity of
the people through a thoroughgoing decentralization. The country would
be divided into a number of states in a federal relationship with the
national government; they would be free to devise their own constitu-
tions, and their legislative, financial, and administrative powers would be
entrenched in the Constitution. The governors of the states would also
have important roles at the national level. A national fiscal commission
with representation from both the center and the states would decide on
important aspects of financial policy and the allocation of grants to the
states. Each state would have its own public service.
The second principle is the primacy of custom and indigenous authori-
ties over Western-type institutions. Consequently there would be a grad-
ual elimination of the received common law by customary law, and more
and more disputes would be channeled to customary tribunals that would
be set up. Each state would have a council of chiefs that would elect its
governor and have advisory as well as executive functions, the latter to
include veto on various categories of legislation. Traditional chiefs would
also be appointed to the national congress of governors, with functions at
the national level similar to those of the council of chiefs. Only persons of
"chiefly lineage and blood" would be eligible to become state governors.
The bill of rights would be modified to recognize the collective rights of
clans, and jurisdiction over land would be transferred from the state to the
clans.
The third principle is the paramountcy of indigenous Solomon Island-
ers. They would enjoy rights superior to those of citizens who acquired
their nationality through naturalization or registration, and the latter
would be liable to lose their citizenship more easily than at present. Only
an indigenous Solomon Islander would be eligible to become president.
The Constitution would authorize discrimination in favor of indigenous
people in a variety of areas-property, loans, education, land, commercial
licensing, and public service. The president would be granted special pow-
ers to ensure privileged treatment of indigenous people.
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The other major proposal under Recommendation I is the establish-
ment of a republic under a president who would normally be required to
act on the advice of the cabinet but would have more powers than the
present governor-general. The president would have the right to refuse a
request for the dissolution of parliament; and might dissolve parliament
on personal discretion if the government lost the budget or there was a
vote of no confidence in the government. It is implied rather than stated
that the president could veto legislative proposals passed by parliament.
The president would need to consult with or have the approval of the con-
gress of governors in the discharge of some presidential functions, includ-
ing assent to specified categories of legislation. Although many detailed
proposals are concerned to weaken the state and elitism, a few go in the
opposite direction. The offices of the ombudsman and the public solicitor
(to provide legal advice to those who cannot afford it) would be abo-
lished, as would the leadership code that aims to prevent corruption and
the abuse of office. More important, legislation against acts prejudicial to
public order would be strengthened and immunized from legal challenge
for breach of human rights, and emergency powers, to be vested in the
president, would not be capable of being questioned in court.
Under Recommendation 2, the basic principles of the independence
constitution would remain. Solomon Islands would stay a unitary state,
although more (but unspecified) powers would be devolved to provinces,
within a legislative rather than a constitutional framework. The major
changes proposed include the establishment of a bicameral legislature, the
replacement of the Queen with an indigenous (but largely ceremonial)
president, and some aspects of the relationship between the prime minister
and the cabinet. The lower house of the legislature (the House of Repre-
sentatives) would be popularly elected on a system currently in force for
parliament, while the Senate (membership of which would be restricted to
indigenous Solomon Islanders) would have a mixed legislature to repre-
sent chiefs and traditional leaders, ten appointed by the president from
persons of high standing in the community, eight appointed by the prime
minister, and six by the leader of the opposition. The Senate would have
the right to review certain legislation, primarily that relating to finance,
natural resources, and custom, but its rejection of it could be overridden
by a three-fourths vote in the House. Alterations of the important provi-
sions of the constitution would be done in a joint sitting of the two cham-
bers.
The powers of the president would be similar to those of the governor-
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general, except in one important respect-the president would be able to
remove the prime minister if the latter lost the support of the ministers.
Several proposals would affect the system of cabinet government. It
would be possible to appoint to the cabinet persons not members of the
legislature-a departure from the parliamentary system of government-
although the cabinet would remain collectively responsible to the legisla-
ture (the expression used is parliament, presumably meaning the elected
House of Representatives). Two somewhat contradictory provisions
would govern the relationship of the prime minister to the cabinet. On the
one hand, the prime minister would be able to direct the other ministers in
the administration of their departments in line with government policy-
no doubt as a means to check wayward ministers, a not uncommon phe-
nomenon, but with implications for the role of the cabinet. On the other
hand, a prime minister who fell out with the ministers would be liable to
removal by the president. In a system dominated by coalition govern-
ments, such a provision could contribute to further political intrigue and
instability, but more important, its fundamental principles seem to be sus-
pect. It is after all the prime minister who is elected by parliament and
who has a mandate from parliament to form a government; other minis-
ters hold office at the pleasure of the prime minister. If the legislature
wishes to bring the government down, it is through a vote of no confi-
dence in the prime minister. The removal of the prime minister through a
vote of no confidence would become more difficult, undoubtedly in an
attempt to promote stability of governments: the resolution of no confi-
dence would name the alternative prime minister; it could not be moved
within six months after the election of the prime minister, within six
months before the dissolution of the legislature, or within three consecu-
tive meetings of parliament after the previous resolution. As in Recom-
mendation I, the posts of director of public prosecutions and public solici-
tor would be abolished-and Solomon Islands would become a Christian
republic, although neither proposal spells out the implications of this rec-
ommendation.
CONCLUSIONS
Given that both reviewing bodies were made up predominantly of politi-
cians, it is surprising that they did not undertake an analysis of the effects
of their respective constitutions on political developments since indepen-
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dence as a basis for evaluation and amendments. It may well be that their
consideration of the constitution was determined by their opinion of these
consequences of the constitution, but that these are assumed rather than
articulated. The reports, particularly that of Solomon Islands, frequently
do not provide a clear rationale for the recommendations, so that it is not
always easy to understand the thinking of the reviewing body. The
approach of both bodies has been a textual analysis, chapter by chapter.
The one exception to this is the text accompanying Recommendation 1 in
the Solomon Islands report, which attributes, in general and sweeping
terms, several consequences to the Constitution. However a closer analy-
sis would make the argument difficult to sustain, because they are more
the consequences of the policies of various governments in no way dic-
tated by the Constitution. The text accompanying Recommendation 1
also attempts an analysis of the circumstances of the country, particularly
the ethnic diversity of the people and the value of their cultural traditions,
as a basis for new constitutional arrangements. The text consequently
produced, as we have seen, proposals for a federal system with an eminent
position for traditional leaders and custom.
Although there is no explicit discussion of the role of eithe~ constitu-
tion, it is clear that both review bodies proceeded on an assumption of the
efficacy of the constitution in effecting relationships and behavior, even
though the commission in Papua New Guinea concluded that the indepen-
dence Constitution has failed in many of its goals. Both professed the pre-
independence belief in the effectiveness of the constitution, but it is doubt-
ful if many outside the review bodies now share that belief. The PNG
commission found not only widespread ignorance of constitutional provi-
sions, but also apathy on constitutional issues, even among senior politi-
cians and public servants (Deklin 1988, 348). It was certainly not easy to
get Parliament to discuss its report; there was some discussion in 1983, and
then none until 1987 when the report was "approved" with some changes.
Six years later, no action has been taken on it. Perhaps people feel that the
Constitution is not central to economic and social processes. The review
bodies have done little to explore the relationship of the constitution to
these processes, and they provide little reliable evidence of the effects of
independence constitutions. If they had done research on these effects,
they might have been in a better position to appreciate the limits of the
constitution. As it is, they, particularly the commission, state that if peo-
ple had greater awareness of the provisions of the constitution, all would
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be well. As a result, they totally ignore the autonomous effects of the
unfolding of economic and social processes, and run the danger of appear-
ing rather quixotic, tilting at economic windmills with reeds of paper. For
example, the proposals of the commission, about the dismissal of minis-
ters and officials for breach of national goals, fly in the face of past prac-
tice and disregard the dynamics of capitalist development in Papua New
Guinea, reminding one of the optimism of the Spanish knight.
Another difficulty with both reports is that they do not set out, except
incidentally, how one is to measure the success of the constitution. The
sole criterion appears to be, What do the people think? This populist
approach is a carryover from the pre-independence era when it was right
and proper that the people should be closely involved in the decisions on
the constitution. Even then, the effect was less to determine the contents
of the constitution than to legitimize it (Ghai 1988a, 46-51). But it is
doubtful if that is a proper approach for an expert body set up to review
how a constitution has operated. It is of course important to consult pub-
lic opinion, but unwise to make that the sole basis of evaluation. The pub-
lic is unlikely to be knowledgeable about many key aspects of relation-
ships and developments that the constitution seeks to regulate. Nor was
the basis of popular consultation such as would elicit the response of the
public to these aspects. Consultation was directed toward asking the peo-
ple what kind of constitution they wanted, rather than what they thought
of the present one (although I realize the two questions are not uncon-
nected). It could be argued that the place of popular consultation was at a
later stage, once the committee had presented its expert and technical
evaluation to the government and parliament and before amendments
were enacted. (This view differs from that of a key member of the com-
mission who thinks its function was to establish public opinion on consti-
tutional changes and questions the right of parliament to disregard its rec-
ommendations [Deklin 1988, 346-347]). Otherwise the functions of the
review body and those of the government and parliament become blurred,
and the advantages of specialization are lost. Either way, it is far easier to
find public opinion on the basis of specific proposals than in the abstract.
It is not entirely surprising that in both countries the greatest interest was
shown in the issue of the head of state, whose constitutional as opposed to
symbolic significance (given the continuing commitment to the westmin-
ster model) was slight.
How then does one assess the record of a constitution in developing
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countries like Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands? One test would
be the contribution the constitution makes to national unity. Both coun-
tries withstood threats of secession at the time of independence, and there
appeared only a fragile basis of unity. Yet the constitutions did eventually
provide solutions, primarily through decentralization, but also through
the establishment of national institutions and an electoral system based on
universal franchise, providing a framework for political decision making
and competition. Another test might be the ease with which the constitu-
tion enabled the transfer of power and the assumption of control over the
state apparatus by the local leaders. Has it established institutions whose
functions in resolving controversies and crises are accepted as legitimate
by the people? Has the constitution succeeded in regulating the relation-
ship among the different organs of the state and effectuating the values it
espouses? Does it provide sufficient security to individuals and communi-
ties and secure the rights of the citizen? Does it provide a framework
within which democratic values and practices can be pursued? Has it ena-
bled stability in government and administration? What effect does it have
on economic development and equality and balanced development?
These are broad questions, and there is no easy or reliable methodology
for answering them. In another place my attempt to examine the political
consequences of constitutions in the Pacific Island states (Ghai I988b)
throws some light on some of these questions, and some of my conclu-
sions would be relevant to a review of a constitution. The westminster sys-
tem in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands has operated without
strong, well-disciplined parties, to the extent that not a single party has so
far been able to form a government on its own. The coalition governments
that result do not produce stable government with a firm control over the
legislative process. A great part of the time of the prime minister is spent
on managing the coalition, which is constantly threatened by the competi-
tion for ministerial office among parliamentarians and given wide rein by
the rules whereby a vote of no confidence leads to a change of government
and not to the dissolution of parliament. Collective responsibility is diffi-
cult to maintain under these circumstances, especially when coalitions are
based not on common policies but on an interest in the perks of power.
Political stability is constantly threatened, for at the first whisper of a con-
spiracy toward a vote of no confidence, normal executive and legislative
functions are immobilized, as the prime ministers and their rivals go about
mustering parliamentary support. Corruption and patronage are the natu-
IMAtty
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ral results, while the political system becomes discredited. Coalitions are
formed after elections rather than before, so that differences of policy
emerge during the term of office of a government and not at its formation.
The westminster system leads to a confrontational and adversarial style of
politics, and downgrades the search for consensus. Deadlocks cannot eas-
ily be resolved. The electoral system, based on first-past-the-post votes
and single-member constituencies, contributes to the multiplicity and
weakness of parties. By encouraging wide candidature and having the
ability to ensure victory on the basis of a small percentage of the total
vote, it weakens the control of the party leaders over its politicians, and
produces members who command no particular support in their constitu-
enCIes.
Both reports address some features of the political system just de-
scribed. However, they accept the basic principle of the westminster sys-
tem, ruling out an executive presidential system and its opposite, the com-
mittee system of government. They do not question the electoral system,
particularly first-past-the-post voting. Both are concerned to provide
some machinery to resolve political deadlocks, primarily by giving certain
discretionary powers to the president-to remove the government or dis-
solve parliament-thus approximating the norms of the older westminster
system. However, the president's discretion is to be subject to advice from
a body of eminent persons.
To ensure the stability of government, both seek to restrict as well as
place additional hurdles on votes of no confidence. There is great concern
to relax the stranglehold that the backbenchers are perceived to have on
the government through their willingness to vote for no-confidence
motions. The result of a successful vote is a change of governments, there
being no mechanism (except in the limited circumstances outlined for
Papua New Guinea) for the dissolution of the legislature. Many proposals
have been made for automatic dissolution in the event of a vote of no con-
fidence as a way to induce circumspection in parliamentarians anxious
about their own privileges. It is significant that more governments have
been displaced by votes of no confidence than by the verdicts of the elec-
torate. The PNG commission has attempted to ensure stability also by
providing for the disqualification from membership of a parliamentarian
who is inconstant in allegiance to a political party. The Solomons commit-
tee has sought to resolve deadlocks within the administration by giving
ministers the right to get rid of the prime minister who appointed them in
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the first instance. These proposals might help, but they might also aggra-
vate the problems, and I have already commented on some of them. It is
doubtful whether they go to the root of the problem, which is found in a
particular conjunction of the westminster model with a particular party
system promoted by the specific electoral system.
Some other aspects of the reviews may be briefly commented on. They
show a continuing obsession with immigrants, even those who have
become naturalized citizens. It is hard to believe that the proposals
respond to any real problem, though the economic and political domi-
nance of (minute) immigrant communities is perceived as a problem. Par-
ticularly fanciful are proposals to protect the indigenous people in Recom-
mendation 1 in the Solomons report. To the proposal that naturalized
citizens should not qualify to be parliamentarians or hold senior positions
in the public service, one can only riposte, How many such citizens
occupy these positions? One does not have to deny that no naturalized cit-
izen has abused this status to decry the racism that motivates these pro-
posals, especially as both review bodies are anxious to accommodate eth-
nic diversity among their indigenous people.
Decentralization, a direct response to this diversity, continues its hbld
on the political imagination (although ironically, the only overt use the
PNG government has made of the review is to attack provincial govern-
ment by endorsing the proposal to abolish the status of Organic Laws,
which would remove the entrenchment provided to decentralization [Ghai
and Regan 1989]). It is unfortunate that neither report discusses the
numerous political, administrative, and financial problems that have
arisen from decentralization. Their proposals on the subject, particularly
those in the Solomons Recommendation 1, must therefore be treated with
considerable caution. The solicitude for human rights in the Papua New
Guinea report may be compared with a somewhat cavalier attitude in the
Solomons report. Surprisingly, neither report has much to say on land,
given the heated controversies that subject raised in the run up to indepen-
dence. The problem of land has not gone away, but it may have been felt
that it is not profitable to handle it through constitutional norms.
One must conclude that the value of the reviews is limited, and one may
question the recommendation in the PNG report that such periodic
reviews must become permanent. One difficulty with both these reviews is
that at the time they were carried out no pressing problem had arisen that
required a constitutional settlement; in both countries constitutions have
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been amended on a number of occasions as the need for specific changes
became evident. Nor had the existing constitutions led to any real crisis.
On the whole they have worked with remarkable success, have promoted
democratic practices, ensured orderly transitions of governments, safe-
guarded citizens against official arbitrariness, and preserved national
unity. The political instability produced by electoral and party systems
and the motions of no confidence is the instability of governments, not of
the country or its policies. There are no serious differences of policies
among the parties or factions. Both countries are embarked on the capital-
ist path to development, whose resilience is unaffected by rotations in the
incumbent prime minister. It is therefore not surprising that the reviews
failed to arouse any enthusiasm. Even where there has been support for
particular proposals, a sufficient degree of parliamentary support has not
been forthcoming since few parties have been able to divorce the justifica-
tions for change from the advantages it would bring to the incumbent
prime minister. It would be wrong to feel an obligation to be bound by the
constitutional shackles of the past, but the lessons of the two reviews may
be that a review is pointless in the absence of a general feeling that some-
thing is seriously wrong with the constitution or that a fundamentally new
constitutional settlement is necessary for the preservation or the renewal
of the national spirit.
* *
I WISH to thank A. ]. Regan for his comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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